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Some theorists have argued that elements of the surrounding world play a crucial
role in sustaining and amplifying both cognition and emotion. Such insights raise an
interesting question about the relationship between cognitive and affective scaffolding:
in addition to enabling the realization of specific affective states, can an affective niche
also enable the realization of certain cognitive capacities? In order to gain a better
understanding of this relationship between affective niches and cognition, I will examine
the use of expressive arts in the context of psychotherapy and peacebuilding. In these
settings, environmental resources and interpersonal scaffolds not only evoke emotion
and encourage the adoption of particular bodily affective styles, but also support the
development of capacities for self-awareness and interpersonal understanding. These
affective scaffolds play a crucial role in therapy and peacebuilding, in fact, insofar as
they facilitate the development of self-knowledge, enhance capacities associated with
social cognition, and build positive rapport and trust among participants. I will argue
that this is because affectivity is linked to the way that subjects frame and attend to
their surroundings. Insofar as the regulation and modification of emotion goes hand in
hand with opening up new interpretive frames and establishing new habits of mind, the
creation of an affective niche can contribute significantly to various modes of cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
Sterelny (2010) has maintained that mind and cognition are “environmentally supported” and
highlights the way in which cognitive agents often engineer their environment so as to sustain
and amplify their cognitive abilities. Drawing on this work, Colombetti and Krueger (2014) argue
that the environment scaffolds not just the mind’s cognitive capabilities, but also its affective ones.
They point to various ways in which agents engineer their affective environments and “in doing so
let these environments influence their affective states in an ongoing way” (Colombetti and Krueger,
2014, p. 4). However, the relationship between (i) the claim that cognition is environmentally
supported, and (ii) the claim that affect is environmentally supported, require further exploration.
Given that affect can influence cognition, the issue arises of whether, when, and how cognition
is indirectly supported by the environment insofar as (a) the environment scaffolds affect and
(b) affect shapes cognition. In addition to enabling the realization of specific affective states, can
affective scaffolding also provide support for certain cognitive capacities?
In order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between affective scaffolds and
cognition, I will examine the use of expressive arts in the context of psychotherapy and
peacebuilding. In these settings, environmental resources and interpersonal scaffolds not only
evoke emotion and encourage the adoption of particular “bodily affective styles,” but also
support the development of capacities for self-awareness and interpersonal understanding. These
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affective scaffolds play a crucial role in therapy and peacebuilding,
in fact, insofar as they facilitate the development of self-
knowledge, enhance capacities associated with social cognition,
and build positive rapport and trust among participants. By
virtue of coming together in an affective niche, participants can
“work through” their feelings and heighten their understanding
of themselves and others. I will argue that this is because
affectivity is linked to the way that subjects frame and attend to
their surroundings. Insofar as the regulation and modification of
emotion goes hand in hand with opening up new interpretive
frames and establishing new habits of mind, the creation of an
affective niche can contribute significantly to various modes of
cognition.
SCAFFOLDING FOR THE MIND
Sterelny (2010, p. 466) emphasizes how “many animals intervene
in their environment, shaping it in ways that improve the
adaptive fit between the agent and the world.” According to
his proposed niche construction model, agents adapt to their
environments, but also adapt their environments to them.
For example, animals construct nests, burrows, and dams;
and human agents alter the informational character of their
environment with the assistance of various tools. The basic idea
is that environmental resources support and amplify cognitive
capacities: by modifying their environment, agents are able to
“alter the informational character of their environment in ways
that make crucial features more salient” (Sterelny, 2010, p. 470).
For example, ants lay scent trails between their nest and food
source, and a hawk chooses a roost that maximizes its view of
its hunting territory. This has cross-generational effects in the
sense that it reshapes the developmental environment of the next
generation. Once the beaver has built a dam, this changes the
environment where it lives, which in turn affects the behavior of
both the beaver and its offspring. As children develop into mature
members of a community, environmental resources structure and
amplify their cognitive processes. These “cumulatively provided
tools for thinking” might be viewed as cognitive technologies
afforded by a culture and include language, arithmetical notation,
maps, road signs, and diagrams.
While the scaffolded mind hypothesis is closely related to
the extended mind hypothesis presented by Clark and Chalmers
(1998), the two are not causally and explanatorily equivalent.
For one thing, the scaffolded mind thesis sidesteps the issue
of whether the environment comes to be a constitutive part of
cognition. Because it makes the weaker claim that environmental
resources play a crucial role in causally supporting cognitive
processes, the scaffolded mind thesis is able to avoid many
of the objections that have been raised against the extended
mind thesis. In addition, the niche-constructivist framework
that Sterelny (2010) prefers is more general than the extended
mind framework. He believes that environmental supports vary
in at least three dimensions, each of which corresponds to a
functional relationship between a resource and an agent and is
a matter of degree. These dimensions are trust, individualism
/entrenchment, and collectivity. When we focus on highly
trusted, individualized and entrenched, single-user resources,
the extended mind framework may very well be appropriate.
However, this is just one of many ways in which cognition can
be environmentally scaffolded.
Colombetti and Krueger (2014) aim to extend Sterelny’s
(2010) niche-constructivist framework and to examine how
environmental resources also support and amplify human
affective capabilities. In their view, affectivity is not simply a
matter of passively undergoing bodily and experiential changes,
but also involves actively modifying one’s environment in order
to sustain, amplify, dampen, or alter one’s affective life. What
these authors call “affective niches” are “instances of organism-
environment couplings (mutual influences) that enable the
realization of specific affective states” (Colombetti and Krueger,
2014, p. 4). While this active manipulation sometimes is the result
of conscious intention, in other instances it is just a part of one’s
habitual way of dealing with the world. Some of the props and
strategies used to construct an affective niche include written
materials, tools for expression, bodily adornments, and works
of art.
There are, indeed, a range of examples of how agents engineer
their affective environments so as to influence their affective
states in an ongoing way. As Colombetti and Krueger (2014)
note, people rely on portable technologies for listening to music
in order to feel more energetic and enthusiastic; they wear
brightly colored clothing to evoke a particular mood; they look
to cinemas, concert halls, and art galleries to keep themselves
interested and stimulated; they use musical instruments to
express and explore a variety of feelings; and they spend time
with family and friends because doing so evokes certain feelings
and allows them to adopt a particular “bodily affective style,”
including distinctive ways of speaking, gesturing, and moving
(Colombetti and Krueger, 2014, p. 7). Of course, not just
any environmental resource counts as an affective scaffold. It
must involve the elements of “trust” and “entrenchment” that
Colombetti and Krueger (2014) cite, drawing from Sterelny’s
(2010) work. Such environmental resources must be trusted,
to a significant extent, to have a particular impact on one’s
affective state, and also be integrated, to a substantial degree,
into one’s bodily activities and daily routine. Within the context
of interpersonal relationships, other people and joint activities
play a central role in shaping one’s affective life. Colombetti and
Krueger (2014) describe how, “by adopting particular styles—
which may transform and adapt over time as other members,
each with their own style, enter or leave the group and change
its dynamic,” social interactors play an active role in shaping
how their relationships function as scaffolding for affectivity
(Colombetti and Krueger, 2014, p. 14). By emphasizing how
subjects actively manipulate the material and social world
for the purposes of regulating their affective condition, these
authors move us away from the tendency of mainstream
affective science to provide an internalist explanation of how
emotional states occur (e.g., via affect programs or cognitive
appraisals). In their view, the surrounding world is not simply
part of the causal background, but rather plays a central
causal role in the evocation and expression of various affective
states.
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I endorse Colombetti and Krueger’s (2014) claim that there are
numerous ways in which our affective states are environmentally
scaffolded by items of material culture, other people, and
their interplay. However, these authors’ discussion of Sterelny’s
(2010) work raises some interesting questions about the relation
between affective niches and cognition that they do not yet
explore. When a musician uses her instrument to explore her
feelings, for example, can she also thereby come to understand
herself and her surroundings in new ways? And in cases where
interpersonal relationships function as affective scaffoldings, is
the capacity for social cognition sometimes altered along with
a subject’s affective condition? What I hope to show is that
affective scaffolding often functions, simultaneously, as cognitive
scaffolding. Because affective niches can support the development
of particular cognitive capacities, there are numerous instances in
which the environment scaffolds a subject’s cognitive abilities by
virtue of scaffolding her affective states. To support this claim, I
will examine how expressive arts can be used in psychotherapy
and peacebuilding settings to evoke affective responses and, at
the same time, enhance participants’ self-understandings and
capacities for social cognition.
AFFECTIVITY AS A SCAFFOLD FOR
COGNITION
Before proceeding, I should say a bit more about the distinction I
am drawing between affectivity and cognition. Affective states, as
I understand them, include background “existential orientations”
(Ratcliffe, 2005), moods, and specifically directed emotions such
as fear or anger. These modes of consciousness all involve
feelings about what matters (Baier, 2004) or “feelings of subjective
import” (Helm, 2001, p. 199). One might say that affective states
are ways in which an individual cares about objects, events, states,
of affairs, other people, her own life, etc. Like Colombetti and
Krueger (2014), I maintain that affective states typically involve a
range of components (Scherer, 2009), including bodily processes,
expressions, action readiness, appraisals, and feelings; and also
that they are enactive, i.e., they are ways of engaging with and
making sense of one’s surroundings. The basic idea is that feelings
of caring help us to make sense of the objects and situations we
encounter and to apprehend our surroundings as an arena of
possible projects and goals. Insofar as affective states involve an
element of appraisal, and as the examples discussed in this paper
will further reveal, there is no sharp divide between affectivity
and cognition. Still, I do not wish to adopt a cognitivist account
according to which affective states simply are a form of judgment.
In my view, the sort of appraisal associated with affective states is
pre-reflective, implicit, non-algorithmic, and fully bound up with
bodily feeling (Maiese, 2011, 2014).
Alongside these feelings of caring, there is also the capacity for
various modes of thought. When I speak of ‘cognitive capacities,’
what I have in mind is cognition in the traditional sense, as
outlined by Sterelny (2010): the abilities associated with various
modes of thought, judgment, problem-solving, and intelligent
action. The particular modes of cognition I discuss in this paper
are social cognition and the meta-cognition associated with
self-awareness. My focus, then, concerns whether the evocation
of particular feelings of caring can “alter the informational
character” of one’s environment (Sterelny, 2010, p. 470) and
thereby enhance or assist various modes of thought and problem-
solving. I believe that the discussion I present here not only
shows how affective scaffolds can support relatively sophisticated
cognitive abilities, but also lends support to an enactive account
of affectivity.
But why think that affective scaffolds make a significant
contribution not only to the emotional dimension of people’s
lives, but also to the cognitive dimension? This is because central
to cognition is the ability to gauge significance and home in
on relevant features of one’s surroundings. As subjects navigate
their way through the world, obviously they do not sequentially
process all of the cognitive and practical information that is
potentially available to them, but instead almost always home in
on certain very specific things rather than others. Although they
tend not to notice it, some degree of attention focusing takes place
in all of their interactions with their surroundings, including
sensory perception, decision-making, and more abstract thought
processes.
This ability to home in on salient features of our environment
and make a cut from the stream of information is what cognitive
scientists call ‘framing.’ If intentional directedness did not involve
an underlying process of framing and selective attention, then
agents in the world would be faced with a potentially endless array
of possible cognitive and interpretive options, and presumably
would merely shut down from information overload. This is
because it is by virtue of framing that we are able to find definite
points, lines, and contours of salience in the complex world
around us, and thereby able to orient ourselves in that world.
Some aspects of our surroundings and situation come to the
foreground, while others fade to the background. The way in
which we frame an object, situation, or event, which essentially
involves highlighting some considerations while overlooking
others, carves out the “starting points” for thought and other
cognitive processes.
Now, it is true that concepts help us to organize complex
information into coherent categories and thereby get our
cognitive and practical encounters with the world ready
for judgment, inference, and self-conscious deliberative
intentions. However, most subjects also have an immediate, pre-
theoretical, non-intellectual understanding of where to direct
their attention in a given context. Detection of which aspects
of our surroundings are relevant typically occurs outside of
reflective self-awareness, is non-algorithmic, and involves bodily
attunement and feelings of subjective import. Bodily affectivity
permeates our interpretations and patterns of attention and
thereby enables us to make sense of the world. Drawing from the
work of Husserl, Ratcliffe (2005) uses the notion of a ‘horizon’
to capture the sense in which the feeling body serves as a
framework through which world-experience and interpretation
are structured. What he calls an ‘existential orientation’ is the
subject’s general sense of her relationship to the world, which is
constituted by bodily feelings and can be understood as a space of
possibility that determines the various ways in which things can
be experienced. Along similar lines, Thompson (2007, p. 374)
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maintains that affect operates as the “allure” of consciousness,
and implies a “dynamic gestalt or figure-ground structure”
whereby some objects emerge into affective prominence, while
others become unnoticeable. This means that a subject perceives
and evaluates her world through a corporeity that is always
already affectively nuanced (Colombetti, 2007, p. 542).
Elsewhere, I have characterized this process of discriminating,
filtering, and selecting information in terms of “affective
framing.” Just as a conceptual frame is a cognitive shortcut
that people rely on in order to categorize features of their
surroundings, an affective frame operates as a feeling-driven
shortcut whose interpretive focus is targeted and contoured by
an individual’s embodied desires and cares. Affective framing
habits, developed over time, yield a pre-reflective, fine-grained
contouring of a subject’s surroundings, so that she immediately
can target and focus her attention. As a result, subjects interpret
persons, objects, facts, states of affairs, and situations in terms
of what they care about. Which information is relevant to a
subject’s thoughts, for example, is partly a function of her desires,
concerns, and overall perspective, so that the bodily feelings
of affective framing function as a structure-giving background
to all experience and a presupposed context for all intellectual,
practical, and social activity. This caring-contoured map of
affective frames also plays an important role in determining
which information in working memory will be held onto, which
will fade out, and which will be called into conscious attention
when needed. Affectivity and bodily feeling thereby bias the
competition for processing resources in favor of information
that subjects feel is important. Such framing determines subjects’
attentive focus, right down to the most fine-grained levels, and
thereby fixes precisely which features of their surroundings
become salient for them. If subjects did not rely on affective
framing, then they would be faced with a potentially endless array
of possible cognitive and interpretive options, and this would
make the task of adapting to their environments very difficult.
Affective frames correspond to the practical, existential
orientation which Ratcliffe (2005) maintains structures all
experience. They also encompass what Colombetti and Krueger
(2014) call a “bodily affective style,” which is an individual’s
characteristic manner of comportment, including her distinctive
ways of speaking, gesturing, and moving. These bodily habits
play a central role in our conduct, and represent “our typical
and cultivated ways of integrating and interacting with the
environment” (Cuffari, 2011, p. 537). Along these lines, Sheets-
Johnstone (2011, p. 160) describes how, over the course of
learning to move our bodies, we forged a large number of
dynamic patterns that became habitual. For example, brushing
one’s teeth, tying a knot, and writing one’s name all were woven
into our bodies as familiar dynamics, and came to “bear the stamp
of our own qualitatively felt movement patterns, our own familiar
synergies of meaningful movement” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011,
p. 160). Similarly, Colombetti (2014, p. 62) describes emotional
expression as a “coordinative structure” and maintains that “adult
expressions can be characterized as relatively recurrent and fixed
patterns whose specific shape has been carved in development
as certain structures occurred more frequently.” This includes
breathing patterns, facial expressions, postures, and characteristic
gestures, which together form a subject’s emotional comportment
and patterns of bodily attunement.
It is important to emphasize, though, that a subjects’ “bodily
affective style” and bodily habits include not just their customary
emotional responses and movement repertoire, but also their
characteristic patterns of attention and habits of interpretation.
Over time, subjects develop a particular “style” of experiencing
the world, and their associations, habits of perception, and
patterns of attention are sedimented in the body. In my view, the
notion of ‘affective framing’ helps to conceptualize the idea that
built-up patterns of bodily attunement and response serve as a
form of “operative intentionality” that encompasses a wide range
of perceptual and behavioral dispositions (Summa, 2012, p. 23).
These affective frames or “habits of mind” involve schemas for
interacting and engaging with one’s environment, and include, for
example, a tendency to notice particular features of people and
events while ignoring others; to naturally trust some sources of
evidence while remaining suspicious of others; to listen carefully
or be easily distracted; and to pick up on subtle nuances of others’
behavior, posture, and tone of voice.
Crucially, as Colombetti and Krueger (2014) note, such
patterns of attention and response are not fixed or static, but
rather “loosely assembled,” dynamic, and susceptible to ongoing
modification. First, a subject’s affective style or affective framing
patterns can shift depending on what sort of niche or social
context she inhabits. For example, someone might exhibit one
sort of affective style while one is teaching and a noticeably
different type of affective style when one is interacting with
one’s friends. Second, a subject’s bodily affective style can change
more significantly over the course of learning and socialization,
and in response to life experiences. Sometimes this change is
gradual and the alteration to a subject’s patterns of attention,
sensitivity, and response is relatively subtle. In other cases,
change is more sudden and dramatic, habits of mind reconfigure,
and subjects undergo changes to bodily comportment and a
pronounced “affective re-orientation.” Whether the change is
gradual and subtle, or more sudden and significant, a shift
in affective framing can open up new avenues for thought,
engagement, and response. As a result of a shift in affective
framing, subjects may become more receptive to certain kinds
of information, as well as more able to appreciate the relevance
and salience of factors that previously had remained obscure.
In short, when a subject’s affective frames and bodily affective
style shift, she develops what might be deemed “new habits of
mind” that alter her characteristic ways of attending to, making
sense of, and actively engaging with their surroundings. What I
will argue is that these shifts in affective orientation can serve
as scaffolding for new modes of thought and cognition. This is
because a shift in affective framing changes not just how one
perceives the world, but what someone remembers, what one
attends to during practical reasoning, and what one notices about
other people. Insofar as affective niches serve to evoke certain
kinds of emotional states, they also have the potential to guide
participants’ attention and foster particular affective framing
tendencies.
In order to examine further how affective scaffolding
simultaneously serves as scaffolding for cognitive processes, I
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turn to expressive arts as an example of one way in which
subjects modify and shape their social environment so that
it fits their human purposes and goals. Sterelny (2010) notes
how minded creatures purposefully alter the character of their
environment so as to make crucial features more salient (Sterelny,
2010, p. 470). Building on this work, I maintain that creating
an environment that evokes particular kinds of affects and
bodily feelings likewise can function as a way to guide subjects’
attention, allowing them to notice particular features of their
surroundings while ignoring others. Within the settings of
therapy and conflict resolution, material items and other people
sometimes interact in the way Colombetti and Krueger (2014,
p. 16) describe to construct a particular “affective niche,” one
which not only allows for particular affective states to take shape
and thrive, but also facilitates self-understanding, perspective-
taking, and social cognition. In fact, it is reasonable to suppose
that expressive arts are introduced in these settings precisely so
as to engineer a particular sort of affective environment, one
which can amplify various kinds of cognitive functioning. For
example, one important way in which the Holocaust has been
commemorated and its full implications understood is through
an appeal to visual art, music, and ceremony. It appears that
such activities allow people to gain insights about the dynamics
of conflict and comprehend what sorts of relationships need to be
fostered in the future.
I propose that the scaffolding provided by expressive arts
serves to sculpt participants’ affective framing patterns, and that
this amounts to the modulation of their habits of attention,
engagement, and response. In some instances, the impersonal
environment shapes affect, and non-socially acquired affective
frames go on to influence and support cognition. In other
instances, affective frames are socially acquired, and also enable
new forms of social interaction. These new interpersonal
possibilities, in turn, serve to further modulate affect, which then
influences cognition, so that a complex social-affective-cognitive
dynamic emerges. Indeed, as the examples I present will show, a
wide range of social-affective-cognitive interactions are possible.
Nonetheless, these cases all demonstrate how affective reframing
can contribute significantly to various modes of cognition. This
is because by evoking various emotions, expressive arts pave
the way for a pronounced alteration in affective orientation and
the formation of new habits of mind. The case of expressive
arts therefore helps to illustrate “the transformative powers of
environmental scaffolds” (Colombetti and Krueger, 2014, p. 3)
with respect to both affectivity and cognition.
DANCE-MOVEMENT THERAPY AND
SELF-UNDERSTANDING
DMT can include rhythmic dance, spontaneous and creative
movement sequences, thematic movement improvisations,
unconscious symbolic body movement, and a range of relaxation
exercises (Mills and Daniluk, 2002, p. 78). Sessions typically
occur in group settings, and begin with a warm-up phase in
which subjects prepare their bodies for action, followed by an
exploration phase in which participants experiment with various
non-directive, improvised movements. The therapist may try to
match the rhythmic components of the music to the energy level
and movement qualities of the group. Some of the participants’
movements that seem most meaningful and emotionally
significant then are selected as “themes” to be explored further
during the core action phase (Ren and Xia, 2013, p. 6). This
sort of semi-structured format provides a safe space for some
degree of spontaneity and creative expression. In such settings,
the physical layout of the space, the positioning of participants,
props, music, and particular movement sequences come together
to create a specific affective niche that allows participants to
“work through” through emotions via movement, expressive
action, and various forms of bodily engagement. In this section,
I will argue that in cases where DMT is particularly effective,
this regulation of affectivity via movement can contribute
significantly to self-understanding. These are cases in which
non-socially acquired affective frames influence and support
cognition.
Insofar as free movements together with rhythm typically
evoke both intense physical sensations as well as strong
emotions, the DMT setting clearly qualifies as an instance of
affective scaffolding. Indeed, DMT provides us with a powerful
example of how of how subjects sometimes actively modify
their environment in order to sustain, amplify, or dampen their
affective lives (Colombetti and Krueger, 2014, p. 4). As movement
sequences unfold, there are opportunities for increased emotional
expression and the controlled, cathartic release of emotions
of joy, sorrow, rage, or frustration. Specific movements not
only reflect certain “inner psychic realities,” but also “call forth
images moods, and memories” (Baum, 1991, p. 99). Because
movement expresses affective states, articulates attitudes, and
presents the subject’s personality, it can be a powerful way to tap
into subjects’ affective condition. Often a certain affective “style”
comes to characterize the dance therapy setting, one which fosters
particular kinds of moods and emotions.
Mills and Daniluk’s (2002) description of the experience of
dance therapy for adult women survivors of child sexual abuse
helps to show how the exploration of emotion through movement
can facilitate self-understanding. These authors conducted in-
depth interviews with five women who had endured sexual abuse
as children and had completed six sessions of dance therapy.
Their qualitative study was intended as a phenomenological
exploration into the lived experience and meaning of dance
therapy for participants and examined the ways in which it
seemed to them to facilitate personal growth and healing. All
of the women in the study described becoming more aware of
their body parts and physical sensations and more comfortable
with the range of emotional sensations they experienced. These
individuals believed that dance therapy helped them to learn
an alternate response to the resurfacing of painful memories.
Previously, they had tended to cope with discomfort by “going
into their heads” and intellectualizing. Dance therapy offered
them a way to bypass this defensive reaction to discomfort and
kept them connected to their bodily sensations and affective
states. It also offered a way to discover bodily truths, i.e.,
an awareness of how deeply their bodies felt things that had
happened to them in the past. By unlocking this sort of “body
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memory,” the participants were able to increase their emotional
awareness and more accurately identify their deeper feelings.
They found that “working in the medium of movement rather
than just words helped to make their emotional worlds more
accessible to them” (Mills and Daniluk, 2002, p. 80). Note that this
increased self-awareness is not simply a matter of gaining access
to new evidence, but also involves refocusing one’s attention
on relevant aspects of one’s memories, desires, perceptions, and
beliefs.
In many cases, free associations in movement also can allow
for the symbolic expression of material that is too painful for
subjects to verbalize (Koch and Harvey, 2012, p. 382), and
because they are not restricted in their use of space or the
intensity of their emotional expression, many participants are
able to have breakthrough cathartic experiences. Insofar as
movement allows for the release and externalization of emotion
in a safe setting, it has the potential to allow participants to
become more aware of buried emotions or inner conflict. Indeed,
many subjects described dance as a unique way to experience
some sort of emotional release:
“My epiphany was a complete body experience. I started sobbing,
and I ended up on the bathroom floor curled up in the fetal
position screaming at my dad, screaming at my mom, that I wasn’t
going to hold onto this anymore. . .. . . and my body let it go. Since
then, I remember the beatings and the sexual abuse, but the pain
isn’t attached to it anymore. I’m not reexperiencing the pain with
every memory” (Mills and Daniluk, 2002, p. 82).
Participants also reported that so-called “authentic
movement” emerged: they were able to follow the inner
impulses associated with their sensations and images and let their
movements unfold naturally, being true to their perceptions,
sensations, and impulses. One participant said that dance
therapy helped her to “open the passages to her emotions and to
express herself in a more authentic way,” so that she moved more
naturally and felt freer in how she expressed her feelings (Mills
and Daniluk, 2002). Along similar lines, Koch and Harvey (2012,
p. 377) describe how “punching out” forms an important part of
some subjects’ dance sequences: subjects punch outward, and in
doing so, are able to express and reconnect with their feelings of
anger and aggression.
Such testimony suggests that in addition to serving as
scaffolding for affectivity, dance and movement offer a way for
subjects to reconnect with their feelings and become more aware
of their inner emotional worlds, including their reactions, beliefs,
behavioral tendencies, and memories. Movement statements
might be understood as “kinetic explorations” (Pallaro and
Fischlein-Rupp, 2002) of images and themes that often are
outside conscious awareness and yet characterize the participants’
outlooks on the world (Baum, 1991, p. 100). Because bodily states,
unconscious feelings, beliefs, and desires all are interconnected,
enhanced experience and processing of bodily and affective
states can contribute to self-awareness and overall cognitive
functioning (Mills and Daniluk, 2002, p. 78). For one thing,
by “grounding” subjects and helping them to “stay with” their
uncomfortable sensations and emotions, dance allows them to
develop more adaptive ways of coping with stress and discomfort.
The hope is that once buried emotions and memories come to
the surface, subjects will be in a better position to “work through”
painful feelings and examine them further.
In addition, because spontaneous movement and emotional
expression helps subjects to reconnect with their bodily
sensations and feelings, it can promote increased bodily
awareness and a stronger and more stable sense of self (Gorham,
1995, p. 363). Dance allows participants to express themselves
without thinking first, and without the need for words or any
sort of verbalization. As subjects move beyond their cognitive
defenses and get a better grasp on how they are feeling, they
also, at the same time, gain increased awareness of their thought
processes and a deeper sense of how past experiences continue
to impact their thoughts, beliefs, and behavior. When particular
emotions “come out,” this can spark recognition of salient factors
regarding a subject’s own life and situation that previously had
gone unnoticed. This counts as a cognitive shift, though one that
very well may occur outside of reflective awareness. Particular
aspects of their thought processes and behavioral tendencies that
they may not have attended to prior to the emotional episode
come to the forefront. One might say that the problem space
of self-understanding is shifted from the individual’s head into
the space where movement sequences unfold. Insofar as bodily
expressivity paves the way for meaningful insights about one’s
thoughts and feelings, it can serve as scaffolding for increased
self-awareness and even, perhaps, processes of self-reflection.
DMT also allows subjects to modify their movement repertoire
and thereby shift their habitual patterns of engagement. Gorham
(1995, pp. 363–364) rightly notes that “self states” can be
observed on the surface of the body in the form of tensions,
some variable and some fixed, which are continually changing.
A subject’s “movement repertoire” is constituted by the range,
characteristics, and frequency of these changes. One movement
attribute is tension flow, which is defined by the bodily response
to rhythmic changes in breathing, other inner stimuli, and
outer stimuli. Tension flow involves not just the amount of
tension localized in one place on the body, but instead “the
quality of changes in tension throughout the body that cast
the forms (shapes) and patterns” of the subject’s movement
repertoire (Gorham, 1995, p. 364). When someone is engaged in
an activity, the tension flow states increase, take on a particular
bodily shape, and involve a particular quality of effort. The very
same movement can have very different qualities and meanings
depending on the speed or intensity with which it is executed
(Colombetti, 2014, p. 119). Because subjects express their desires
and concerns through movement, a shift in characteristic patterns
of movement can involve a corresponding change to their
affective frames and “habits of mind” that alters the way in which
they make sense of themselves and their situation.
Modified affective frames can allow subjects to become
more keenly aware of pertinent facts, more attuned to their
own personal blind spots, and more capable of detecting
oversimplifications, exaggerations, and false dichotomies in their
own thought processes. Affective reframing therefore has the
potential to shift the way that subjects make sense of their
everyday struggles and allow them to become more aware,
for example, of how their feelings of fear or anger have a
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continuing influence on their behavior. This enhanced capacity
for selective attention constitutes an improvement in subjects’
problem-solving abilities insofar as it facilitates more accurate
meta-cognitive judgments about their beliefs, desires, and overall
state of mind. As a result of this shift in affective orientation,
subjects are better able to arrive at meta-cognitive judgments
of the form, “I am afraid of X,” “I am angry about Y,” and “I
remember Z.” DMT thereby serves as a striking example of an
affective niche that allows subjects to attend appropriately to their
emotions, desires, and needs and thereby increases their overall
self-awareness.
DANCE AND THE CREATION OF
“WE-SPACE”
In the previous section, I described how cognitive processes
associated with self-awareness can be facilitated via non-
socially acquired affective frames. However, in other instances,
interpersonal interaction plays a more central role. In these cases,
the social environment shapes affect in such a way that it opens
up new possibilities for interpersonal interaction. These new
possibilities, in turn, further re-shape affect, which influences
and supports social cognition. Baum (1991, p. 101) describes
how a group session might unfold: the group sits in a circle of
chairs, and the leaders check with each member, both verbally and
non-verbally, to gauge their mood. After an initial warm-up, the
group stands and begins to move. At times, synchrony develops
and the participants move together rhythmically; but in other
cases, individuals take turns initiating movement sequences, and
other members of the group either observe that movement or
try to match the movement quality of the initiating subject.
The goal is to mimic that subject’s quality of movement and to
resonate with it in order to get a sense of the emotions that
are being expressed (Koch and Harvey, 2012, p. 375). As the
members take turns executing new movements and mirroring
each other, they become more aware of feelings and states of
mind associated with interactional movements and also begin
to appreciate others’ perspectives (Pallaro and Fischlein-Rupp,
2002, p. 38). On the one hand, the mirroring of someone else’s
movement increases one’s capacity for empathy and the ability to
use one’s own body for interpersonal resonance. Group members
learn how their movements affect others as well as how they
react to others’ movements. Imitation and synchronization can
serve as a means of inviting others into a relationship, conveying
acceptance, and building trust (Colombetti, 2014, p. 200). On
the other hand, subjects who have an opportunity to direct the
group DMT session can gain a sense of agency and control, and
the experience of being mirrored typically brings with it a sense
of validation and recognition. Not surprisingly, then, moving in
synchrony or coordinating movements with others can foster
feelings of togetherness, trust, and positive rapport. In fact, the
intense bodily resonance that arises via dance and movement
sometimes might even be viewed as a matter of “kinesthetic
empathy” (Baum, 1991, p. 101).
The case of DMT powerfully illustrates how interactions
between various individuals within a collectively structured
environment can function as affective scaffolding and enable
the achievement of affective states that are inaccessible to the
isolated subject. This is because the initiation of particular kinds
of movements evokes emotion in oneself as well as the other
participants. Both the subject who initiates the movement, as
well as those who imitate or move in synchrony with her, come
to experience specific kinds of affective states that depend in
part on the expressions and behaviors of others. To some extent,
this might be understood as a matter of emotional contagion
or what some theorists have described as “automatic emotional
resonance” (Hatfield et al., 1994, p. 2). When other people laugh,
we are inclined to laugh too; when other people are anxious, we
become anxious; and when others are at ease, this puts us at ease.
Similarly, the movements and expressions of someone engaged in
a DMT therapy session influence and modulate the emotions and
expressions of other participants. Thus, the case of DMT shows
how “members of a group may provide ongoing resources and
feedback that scaffold the experience and expression of emotions
unique to a certain context” (Colombetti and Krueger, 2014,
p. 11).
The affective states that are scaffolded by DMT (such as trust
and empathy), in turn, open up new interpersonal possibilities
and facilitate the construction of what Krueger (2011, p. 644) calls
“we-space”: “an emotion-rich coordinative space dynamically
structured via the ongoing engagement of social agents.” A
shared we-space centers upon co-regulated interaction, whereby
participants continually and mutually adjust their expressive
gestures, gaze patterns, vocalizations, and actions. Bodily
expressions serve as “expressive scaffolding” for social cognition
in the sense that they convey extensive information about
individuals’ moods, emotional states, intentions, and behavioral
competence. The establishment of we-space counts as a niche
that transforms the informational load placed on individual
agents and opens up new opportunities for thought and action.
Krueger (2011, p. 653) points to various examples of interactional
synchrony between infants and caregivers and describes how “the
rhythmic coupling of patterns of expressive movements” serve as
bodily expressive proto-conversations. From the very beginning
of a child’s life, other people use expressions and gestures to invite
him into some sort of communicative activity with them. For
example, a caregiver makes a pointing gesture and draws the
child’s attention to something she wants him to see. Infants as
young as 4 months old are attuned to the eye gaze of others and
use eye gaze cueing to help them process objects. In addition,
joint attention helps young infants to recognize the relevance of
social information, and they rely on eye contact and tone of voice
to determine when information is intended for them. Likewise,
within the context of dance movement therapy, participants
have access to fine-grained social information over the course
of dynamic, embodied engagement. During this direct, face-to-
face social encounter, the movements and emotional expressions
of one party orient the attention and interpretive activity of the
other and they come to share in each other’s perspective and point
of view.
As a result of these new interpersonal possibilities,
participants’ need to rely on verbal expression is diminished. This
is crucial given that subjects often find it very difficult to express
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their emotions and concerns in words. Movement sequences,
the manipulation of space, the positioning of participants, and
the choice of music serve as tools for the exploration of emotion
and increased social understanding. The interactive character of
this engagement alters the structure of that particular cognitive
niche (the we-space), and generates new processes of shared
feeling and understanding that are specific to that exchange
(Krueger, 2011, p. 646). What I wish to emphasize is that this
cognitive niche is also, simultaneously, an affective niche, and
that both social cognition and affect depend on the scaffolding
provided by the dance movement therapy setting. And this is no
accident. Imitation and the coordination of movement evokes
emotion and fosters empathic attunement, which in turn allows
participants to understand each other. Via the alignment of
movements, gestures, and vocalizations, participants are able
to share intentions and construct felt contexts of sympathetic
attunement (Krueger, 2011, p. 649). This strengthens their
capacity for interpersonal understanding and also can allow new
meanings to emerge over the course of the encounter.
I have suggested that the new interpersonal possibilities
provided within the DMT setting further re-shape affect and
thereby support social cognition. One way to make sense of this
is in terms of the mutual modulation of the participants’ affective
frames. Gallagher (2005) suggests that social cognition involves
processes that occur on the level of bodily sensations, in particular
kinesthesis, or sensory experience of one’s own movement. When
we see someone else act in a certain way, our own kinesthetic
system is activated in a way that mirrors the perceived action of
the other person. Likewise, when we see someone else engage in
expressive activity, our own bodily affective system is activated
in a way that mirrors the expressions of the other person.
Throughout the group DMT session, subjects modulate, and
are being modulated and affected by, the expressions, gestures,
and actions of other participants, and this mutual modulation
impacts their perspective and habits of interpretation. Through
imitation, synchronization of gestures, mimicking of postures,
turn-taking, and other sorts of coordination, subjects may shift
their point of view and begin to develop new habits of openness
and responsivity. Just as a smiling face invites us to smile
back, people dancing invite us to join them in that activity
and share in their feelings. We involuntarily attune to them
with a mimetic response, and our patterns of bodily attunement
shift.
Ratcliffe (2007, p. 149) rightly maintains that these dynamics
of “mutual influence” are rooted in “a distinctive kind of bodily
responsiveness comprised, at least in part, of patterns of motor-
readiness and an affective sensibility to gestures and expressions”
(Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 158). Insofar as their affective frames (their
patterns of focus and attention) are correlated and coordinated,
the interactors are made interdependent and their desires and
point of view are altered. Once two or more interactors become
part of a coupled system, their bodily dynamics, postures, and
expressions become coordinated to some extent, so that each
person’s behaviors modulate the affective frames of the other
participants. What is more, each subject understands the desires,
thoughts, and emotions of the other participants in large part
because of the impact that their expressive behavior and action
have on his perspective and emotions. Sharing in one another’s
feelings allows subjects to share in one another’s point of view.
In addition, because each individual’s “habits of mind” are
shifted over the course of the interaction in accordance with
other participants’ desires and concerns, face-to-face interaction
has the potential to bring about a pronounced “affective re-
orientation” that shifts the perspective of each of the parties
involved. By evoking emotion and encouraging the adoption
of a particular bodily affective style, group DMT can shift the
way that participants frame their personal struggles as well as
their relationships with others. Affective reframing enhances
their capacity to attend to fine-grained social information, and
participants become more able to detect subtle aspects of others’
bodily comportment, gesture, and expression. Again, this occurs
in large part via the ‘motor resonance,’ bodily reverberation,
bodily attunement, and bodily coordination that takes place
in the DMT setting. By moving together, subjects are able to
create meaning together and to gain new understandings that
were unavailable to them as isolated subjects. Group bodily
coordination thereby opens up a “shared bodily affective space”
(Colombetti, 2014, p. 201) in which new opportunities for social
understanding can arise. This illustrates how the provision of
certain kinds of affective scaffolding can strengthen people’s
capacity for social cognition. In addition, as I will discuss in the
next section, this increased capacity for intersubjective bodily
attunement can pave the way for more sophisticated forms of
perspective-taking and joint understandings.
ARTISTIC EXPRESSION,
PARTICIPATORY SENSE-MAKING, AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Examples from the field of conflict resolution add further
support to the claim that expressive activities can open up new
ways of interacting and relating and cultivate an “openness”
to others’ perspectives. As Yorks and Kasl (2006, p. 52) note,
expressive activities provide subjects with a “brief portal of entry”
into another individual’s unique point of view. By “affording
glimpses into the other’s world of experience,” (Yorks and
Kasl, 2002, p. 187) and allowing participants to share their
feelings, expressive activities can open up new opportunities for
perspective-taking and help to establish empathic connections.
In part this is because by evoking certain kinds of emotion,
these expressive activities can enable subjects to experience a
radical transformation in consciousness that has the potential
to dislodge their habitual assumptions and to recognize aspects
of their situation that previously had gone unnoticed. One
might say that expressive activity helps to shift the problem
space of social understanding from individual heads into the
interactive space of embodied engagements (Krueger, 2011,
p. 653). Such activities function by way of emotional exposure
and bodily engagement, rather than conventional intellect, to
shift participants’ perspectives and habits of mind. This can be
crucial in conflict resolution settings, where subjects need to work
together to move toward solutions, and yet may find constructive
verbal dialog difficult to initiate. In fact, in cases of intractable
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conflict, mere persuasion or the provision of more information is
unlikely to transform how subjects frame their situation. Because
expressive activities offer a way to shift individuals’ “cognitive
and emotive path” (Long and Brecke, 2003, p. 28) and thereby
foster new understandings about identity, relationships, and ways
forward (LeBaron, 2002, p. 139), they have the potential to be
even more effective than explicit negotiation and verbal dialog in
some cases.
In the previous section, I maintained that the incorporation
of expressive arts can be viewed a way to engineer and exploit
we-space in order to sculpt parties’ attention and foster new
habits of mind. This is one way in which social interaction
shapes affective framing. In addition, the use of expressive
arts in conflict resolution settings can contribute to what De
Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) call ‘participatory sense-making’:
“the coordination of intentional activity in interaction, whereby
individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains
of social sense-making can be generated that were not available
to each individual on her own” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007, p. 497). There are a wide range of examples that illustrate
how, through the coordination of intentional activity, the way
that each individual understands a situation is mediated by
the sense-making activities of the other person(s) involved
in the encounter (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Just as
expressive behaviors such as smiling, crying, or blushing are
ways of modulating the affective states of others, engaging
in expressive activities can serve as a way to for participants
to influence one another’s affective states and points of view.
Affective coordination is particularly evident in situations of
intricate bodily coordination, such as group dance, in cases where
there is motor mimicry, matched or coordinated body positions,
and complementary movements or gestures. Likewise, working
together on a creative project involves bodily coordination that
can modulate participants’ affective states and create a space in
which new meanings can arise; and even watching someone else
dance or listening to music can evoke emotion and thereby shift
the way that participants view their situation. This sort of social
interaction modulates affect and thereby shapes and supports
cognition.
One example of participatory sense-making that De Jaegher
and Di Paolo (2007) present is that of Janet, who stands in front
of an open window and takes an appreciative breath of fresh
air in such a way as to make sure that John notices it. In their
view, this is a communicative act: Janet wants John to attend to a
particular salient part of the world and notice certain things that
are visible to both of them, “to engage imaginatively with certain
possibilities which these things present,” and “to frame the visible
world in a certain way” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 499).
John understands Janet’s desires, thoughts, and emotions in large
part because of the impact that her expressive behavior and action
has on his perspective and patterns of attention. His affective
orientation and bodily dynamics are shifted over the course of
the interaction in accordance with Janet’s desires and concerns,
and this shift goes a long way in helping him to understand
Janet’s perspective. Similarly, during a game of charades, all
of the interactors must adjust their sense-making so that it
converges toward the ‘right’ gesture and the ‘right’ interpretation.
The meaning of gestures is jointly constructed and transformed
during the game. Here each individual’s “understanding of the
other person is constituted within the perception-action loops
that define the various things that [she] is doing with in or in
response to others.” (Gallagher, 2008, p. 168).
Likewise, in conflict resolution settings, expressive activities
can function as communicative acts whereby subjects try to adjust
other participants’ “cognitive and affective take on the world”
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 499). Such activities have
the potential to draw parties’ attention to particular features of
other individuals’ emotional states and perspectives, to highlight
previously unnoticed considerations, and to make certain facts
more salient. In addition, the incorporation of expressive arts
may help to foster a mood of trust, promote feelings of
empathy, and thereby foster a “bodily affective style” among the
participants that is conducive to peacebuilding. It seems, then,
that expressive arts shape affect (e.g., by fostering a mood of
trust), which then opens up new possibilities for interaction; and
such interactions, in turn, pave the way for affective reframing
that has the potential to shift parties’ understanding of their
situation.
One example of the use of expressive arts in a conflict
resolution setting comes from Northern Ireland. In August of
1998, after the ceasefire had been declared, the last major bomb
went off in the town of Omagh. Twenty-nine people died and
many feared the collapse of the Irish peace process and a return to
violence. The public responded by sending flowers and wreaths,
which arrived by the 100s to fill the town streets. In response to
questions about what to do with all the flowers, an artist named
Carole Kane proposed that they use them to make paper. In what
came to be known as Petals of Hope, people from all walks of
all life and from both sides of the conflict gathered in a series
of workshops. As they transformed the flowers from the wreaths
and arrangements into textured paper, people talked about their
experiences and where they had been when the bomb went off.
Through creative activity, many people were able to acknowledge
and deal with their loss and continue to move toward a peaceful
future (Lederach, 2005, p. 157). I hypothesize that this creative
activity served as scaffolding for constructive dialog, the “working
through” of emotions, and the process of building peace. Material
elements of this scaffolding included the flowers and wreaths, the
tools participants used to transform them into textured paper,
and the physical space in which the workshop took place. And
interpersonal elements of this scaffolding included the patterns
of interaction and dialog established among the participants.
This joint creative activity encouraged the adoption of a certain
kind of bodily affective style and mood among the participants,
one characterized by collaboration and the sharing of personal
experiences. Such activity likely changed not just how subjects
felt about the conflict, but also, simultaneously, the way they
framed their future together. Joint participation in this loosely
coordinated activity thereby made a positive contribution to their
capacity to share meanings and understand each other.
Another sort of expressive activity that people throughout the
world rely on to prevent and manage conflict and to move toward
reconciliation is ritual. Ceremonies and ritual customs contribute
to communal harmony and individuals’ emotional well-being by
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giving them an outlet for their feelings of grief, anxiety, or anger.
Rituals such as dancing, art, ceremonies, and holiday traditions
rely heavily on sensory cues and symbolic activity as a form
of communication. The smudging ceremony is one example of
a peacebuilding ritual that is used in many Native American
communities to address various forms of conflict. A Native Elder
usually leads the ceremony and begins by lighting a mixture of
cedar, sweetgrass, tobacco, and sage and fanning the burning
mixture to direct the smoke toward the other participants. Then
the Elder invites participants to smudge by fanning the smoke
toward themselves (Schirch, 2005, p. 66). They scoop it over
their heads and down their faces and bodies so that the smoke
fills the air, and then end by taking a deep breath of it before
the meeting or conference begins. Here, a set of actions, smells,
and visual symbols creates a unique space that symbolically
supports, and thereby scaffolds, the work of building peace. In
part this expressive activity functions so as to evoke a particular
mood and foster a particular sort of affective orientation among
participants. Smells, shared movements, deep breathing, and the
fanning of the smoke together create an affective niche that not
only alters how the parties feel, but also changes their overall
cognitive outlook and perspective. The smudging ritual helps
individuals to focus on why they are there and what sorts of
relationships they hope to develop (Schirch, 2005, p. 73), and this
sort of reframing is central to building peace.
Like ritual, performance art sometimes plays a powerful role
in bringing about constructive change. This sort of artistic
expression involves emotional and sensual engagement and
allows parties to tap into the relational and spiritual dimensions
of conflict. As emotions undergo transformation, parties begin
to frame and interpret their situation in new ways. For example,
in the 1980s, when international mediation efforts to stop the
war between Mali and Burkina Faso were failing, the president
of neighboring Guinea persuaded the presidents of these two
countries to attend a meeting at his palace. There, in front of
the Presidential Palace, one of West Africa’s celebrated praise
singers (Kanja Kouyate) performed for the visiting presidents.
Through poetry, song, and dance, Kanja Kouyate called on the
presidents to lead their people toward peace. He appealed to
their human goodness as leaders and asked them to free their
peoples from the shame and suffering of continued conflict.
The performance was so emotional that the two presidents
shed tears, embraced, and publicly vowed not to return to
war. In this instance, artistic expressive helped to catalyze an
experiential break, one which affectively “moved” the parties
involved, disrupted their existing schemas, and ultimately shifted
the way that they framed the conflict and envisioned ways
forward. Within the next 2 months, they had signed a lasting
peace agreement (Lederach, 2005, p. 155). It seems clear that this
introduction of poetry, song, and dance functioned as crucial
affective-cognitive scaffolding: Kouyate’s performance not only
influenced the affective states of those watching, but also created
an environment in which the leaders could envision a way
forward. This is because Kouyate’s desires and perspective, as
expressed through his singing, influenced the way in which those
watching the performance made sense of themselves and their
surroundings. By modulating their emotions, Kouyate’s singing
was able to bring about a shift in perspective and point of view.
This illustrates, once again, how affective scaffolds simultaneously
buttress cognitive capacities, and also how affective reorientation
often goes hand in hand with cognitive transformation.
I have conceptualized this formation of new interpretive
frames and habits of attention in terms of affective framing.
The basic idea is that by tapping into motivational, emotional,
and relational elements of subjects’ lives, expressive activities
modulate the affective frames of the parties involved. These
new modes of affective attunement constitute a modification in
perspective and an alteration in patterns of emotional sensitivity.
I hypothesize that Kouyate’s performance altered the participants’
emotional state, allowing for a change in their affective frames
and habits of bodily attunement, and that as a result of a shift in
affective framing, participants actually became more receptive to
certain kinds of information, more “open” to alternative points
of view, and more able to appreciate the relevance and salience
of factors that previously had remained obscure (e.g., both sides’
shared desire for peace). This suggests that affective reframing
has the potential to change subjects’ sense of what is true or
inevitable, help them to imagine alternative ways in which the
world might be structured, and allow them to envision new
modes of social interaction. It also may help subjects to become
more keenly aware of pertinent facts, more capable of detecting
oversimplifications, and more receptive and responsive to the
concerns of others. What is more, it can dramatically change
their sense of what sorts of actions are possible, opening up new
avenues for social engagement and response.
A CONCLUDING CAUTIONARY NOTE
I have argued that the evocation of emotion can lead to a shift
in affective framing and thereby make a positive contribution
to self-knowledge and interpersonal understanding. One might
object, however, that because affectivity and emotion typically
have a distorting influence on cognition, affective scaffolding
may very well detract from subjects’ cognitive capacities rather
than scaffolding them. We know that emotions sometimes ‘skew
the epistemic landscape’ (Goldie, 2004, p. 99) by highlighting
features of the world that are not truly relevant, steeping us in
bias, or blinding us to certain aspects of our situation. Instances
when affective framing leads to error include moments when
we “actually only [look] at the world through the lens of our
disgust, or our shame, and mistakenly [suppose] the evoking
situation to have the kind of morally significant features that
would warrant these emotions” (Jones, 2006, p. 48). Maladaptive
habits of mind and emotional reactivity can serve to reinforce
false assumptions, solidify unhealthy feelings, and render subjects
unable to appraise things accurately and realistically. Once we
understand emotion’s role in providing us with an interpretive
lens, the danger of evoking emotions that lead to a warped
outlook becomes readily apparent. It is true that the evocation
of certain kinds of affective states sometimes distorts perception,
obscure the truth, and contribute to faulty assumptions and
interpretations. Intense emotions of grief, anger, or fear even can
lead to “cognitive blindness”: people see what they feel, and they
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are so caught up in their own feelings and perspective that they
become blind to alternative ways of viewing things. Thus, there is
a danger that the use of expressive arts will evoke emotions that
negatively impact the processes of therapy and peacebuilding.
It is important to acknowledge, then, that the use of affective
scaffolds to evoke emotion is a risky endeavor and that expressive
activity must be introduced thoughtfully and carefully so as
to ensure that it makes a positive contribution to cognition.
Especially at the beginning stages, great emphasis should be
placed on fostering feelings of empathy and respect and building
positive rapport among the participants. It also is important
to provide a semi-structured format that can serve both as a
safe space, as well as a setting for some degree of spontaneity
and emotional expression. The fact that DMT often plays such
a productive role in the therapeutic process suggests that it is
possible to organize settings in such a way that they cultivate
emotional expression and, simultaneously, help participants to
be more accurate, effective, and insightful cognizers. There is
little doubt, obviously, that critical reflection and reasoning
likewise play a pivotal role in the cognitive processes associated
with self-understanding and social cognition. With the help of
rational assessment, subjects can shift their perspectives, alter
their affective orientation, and gain new understandings. Just
as cognitive processes are partly a matter of affective framing,
the sort of affective framing patterns that a person develops
are partly a matter of reflective thought processes. My central
claim is simply that affective reframing can make a significant
contribution to both therapy and peacebuilding, and that when
it does, this serves as powerful illustration of the way in which
affective scaffolds can serve, simultaneously, as scaffolding for
cognition. More research should be done to investigate how
expressive arts might be utilized as affective-cognitive scaffolding.
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